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Abstract
Recent empirical studies show that the intergenerational persistence of economic status in
the U.S. is much higher than previously thought. We develop a quantitative theory of
inequality and intergenerational transmission of human capital where parents invest in early
and college education of their children subject to borrowing constraints. Children differ
exogenously in innate abilities, which can be correlated with their parent’s innate ability.
An important feature of the environment is that the quality of early education determines
the probability of college completion. We calibrate a stationary equilibrium of this economy
to relevant statistics in aggregate U.S. data, and use it to investigate the sources of inequality
and persistence in earnings. In our benchmark model, about half of the intergenerational
persistence and one fourth of the inequality in earnings are accounted for by endogenous
investments in education. We find that early investments in education account for most
of the endogenous persistence in earnings, while college education generates most of the
endogenous inequality in earnings. Our theory is suited to study the effect of educational
policies on the persistence of inequality. We show that public resources devoted to early
education have the largest impact on earnings mobility. Moreover, non-progressive college
subsidies generate more intergenerational persistence of earnings.
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1 Introduction
The degree to which economic status is transmitted across generations is of great importance
because it represents a measure of the degree of equality of opportunities in a society. Recent
empirical estimates of the intergenerational mobility in income, earnings, consumption, and
other relevant measures of economic status have found low degrees of mobility in the U.S.
economy1. As an example, a general finding is that the intergenerational persistence in
earnings, measured as the slope coefficient obtained by regressing children’s log earnings
when adults against parents’ log earnings, is around 0.4. That is, around 40% of parents
relative position in the distribution of earnings is transmitted to their children.
Our aim in this paper is to identify and measure the major sources of intergenerational
mobility. To do so, we develop a quantitative theory of inequality and intergenerational
transmission of human capital. Numerous studies emphasize the importance of early child-
hood education in determining future outcomes2. Our model incorporates this element by
having parents invest in both early and college education of their children. Both sorts of
investments are subject to borrowing constraints. In this environment we study the role of
human capital investments in accounting for inequality and persistence of earnings. We find
that about half of earnings persistence and one fourth of earnings inequality are accounted
for by endogenous investments in education. Moreover, early investments in education ac-
count for most of the endogenous persistence in earnings, while college education generates
most of the endogenous inequality in earnings.
Our analysis is not the first to attribute intergenerational persistence to human capital
investments. Becker and Tomes (1979) emphasize innate ability transmission with borrow-
ing constraints to human capital investments. Loury (1981) provides a similar analysis but
without innate ability transmission across generations. Differently than these papers, ours
is a quantitative assessment of the human capital contribution to persistence and inequality.
More recently, calibrated general equilibrium models have been used to study the evolution
of income and wealth distributions over time and across generations3. Differently than these
previous models, ours features human capital investments as a two-stage process: early and
college education. In our framework, we determine and quantify the relative importance of
1For surveys of these estimates, see Stokey (1999) and Solon (2000).
2See Neal and Johnson (1996), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Currie and Thomas (1999), and Heckman
(2000).
3See Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Regal´ıa and Rı´os-Rull (1999), Ferna´ndez and Rogerson
(2001), Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and Rı´os-Rull (2002), Knowles (1999), Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri
(2001), and Erosa and Koreshkova (2001).
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early versus college education on both persistence and inequality. This relative importance
is a crucial for policy analysis. Moreover, an important implication of the distinction be-
tween early and college education is that our model attributes differences in earnings within
educational attainment groups to differences in early educational investment, rather than to
an unrelated shock to earnings that is difficult to measure in the data.
Our theory of earnings inequality and persistence has the following features. The
economy is populated by a large number of overlapping generations organized into dynasties.
Each individual lives for four periods and population stays constant over time. In the first
two periods, individuals make no decisions, obtain education, and work. In the last two
periods, individuals work, make educational investment decisions for their children, and
household consumption decisions. Individuals are born with innate abilities that may be
correlated with parent’s ability. Sacerdote (2002) and the references therein provide strong
empirical evidence in support of both genetic and environmental factors determining lifetime
economic status.
In the first period of life individuals acquire education of differing qualities depending
on the resources spent by parents4. In the second period of life individuals may go to
college, if parents pay a fixed cost, with a completion risk. The dropout probability depends
on acquired ability in the first period of life5. Both early and college education can be
paid for only out of current consumption (there is no borrowing or saving). While this
latter assumption is quite strong, there is substantial evidence that borrowing constraints are
important in determining parental investments in education, especially at the early education
stage (see for instance Heckman, 2000 and Keane and Wolpin, 2001).
In our model investments in early education face a tighter borrowing constraint and
are less risky than college investments. Both of these properties work to amplify the role of
early education in generating persistence relative to college education. Borrowing constrained
parents are more likely to have children with similar earnings. Since poor families tend to
under-invest in their children’s education, they are less likely to find it attractive to send their
children to college. This selection property of college attendance makes borrowing constraints
less severe at the college stage. Moreover, since college education faces a completion risk,
this reduces persistence and increases inequality.
4Resources devoted to early education are an abstraction of many different interpretations: parent’s time
and human capital, teacher and school quality, foregone earnings of individuals in school, peer group effects,
among others. Distinguishing between these different alternatives is an important topic for future research.
5This assumption is consistent with the evidence on college completion in Manski and Wise (1983) and
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2001).
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We use our theory to study the effects of government expenditures in early education
and in college subsidies on the intergenerational persistence of earnings. The role of the
government in providing for public funding to education has been recognized as an important
instrument to enhance social mobility and equality of opportunities in a world with imperfect
capital markets. We find that an increase in public resources devoted to early education have
a larger impact on mobility than an increase in college subsidies, since these resources target
young parents facing tighter borrowing constraints at a stage of decisions with important
lifetime consequences. Moreover, moving from the current need-based college subsidy system
to a flat subsidy would significantly increase the intergenerational persistence of earnings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the economic envi-
ronment. In section 3, we parameterize and calibrate the benchmark economy to U.S. data.
Section 4 reports the properties of the benchmark economy regarding inequality, persistence,
and the cross-sectional correlations between variables of interest. In section 5 we illustrate
the sources of persistence and inequality by shutting down one feature of the environment at
a time, in particular, we consider an environment without innate ability correlation across
generations, without early education, and without college education. Section 6 documents a
set of policy experiments in education. Finally we conclude with some suggestions for future
research.
2 Economic Environment
We develop a theory of inequality and intergenerational transmission of human capital that
features both early investments in education and college education. We study the sources of
inequality and persistence in this environment, as well as the impact of educational policies
often discussed in public policy debates.
2.1 General Description
The economy is populated by individuals that live for four periods, two as children in their
parent’s household and two as adults. We refer to individuals starting their third period of
life (this is, their first period as adults) as young parents. Each of these individuals, together
with one newborn child, form a household unit that lasts for two periods. At the end of the
second period the old parent dies and her child becomes a young parent, starting her own
household. This process repeats itself over time. At each moment, there is a mass one of
individuals of each age, so population is constant over time.
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We assume that parents make all the decisions, but they care about their children’s
utility. Young parents differ in their human capital and the innate ability of their children.
Innate abilities are drawn from a common distribution, and may potentially be correlated
across generations. With this information, young parents decide the household total con-
sumption and the amount of resources devoted to their children’s early (primary and ele-
mentary) education. Because we prevent agents from borrowing and lending, young parents
might be credit constrained for early schooling investments.
Old parents differ in human capital and in what we call acquired ability of their children.
The acquired ability of a child depends upon two things: innate ability and (private and
public) expenditures in early education. Old parents decide whether to send their children
to college and household consumption. The college option requires to pay both a fixed
cost in resources and a time cost, and involves, as in Caucutt and Kumar (2001), a risk
of no completion. A higher acquired ability is associated with a lower dropout probability.
The resulting human capital of the child depends upon her acquired ability and college
completion.
We abstract from physical capital and aggregate uncertainty in this economy. Output
of the unique good in the economy is determined by a constant returns to scale technology
that depends on aggregate human capital. We assume that individuals human capital are
perfect substitutes in production.
There is a government that taxes labor income at an exogenously given and time
invariant rate. The proceedings of this tax are used to provide public resources to early
education, equally distributed among all children in early school age, and to subsidy college
expenditures with a progressive scheme in which poor parents receive a higher subsidy. We
assume the government balances its budget each period. We focus on a stationary equilibrium
in this environment where all aggregate allocations and and prices are constant over time.
2.2 Young Parents’ Problem
At the beginning of the period, a young parent has an individual state characterized by
xy ≡ (hy, pi) where hy is human capital and pi is the realized innate ability of the child.
In this general setup, we assume that innate abilities follow a first order discrete Markov
process with mean normalized to one, pimin > 0, and transition matrix Φ. By choosing
appropriately the values in Φ (as described later) we can represent different degrees of in-
tergenerational transmission of abilities, including the case of no innate ability transmission
across generations.
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Given a wage rate w and the amount of public spending in early education g, the
problem of a young parent is described by the following functional equation,
Vy(hy, pi) = max
cy>0,e>0
{u(cy) + βVo(ho, pi, pˆi)},
s.t. cy + e = (1− τ)why,
pˆi = G(pi, e, g),
ho = ξhy,
where τ is the income tax rate, cy denotes household’s consumption, e is expenditures in
child’s early education, and pˆi represents old child’s acquired ability. G is a production
function for human capital, increasing in its three arguments, transforming innate ability
and expenditures into acquired ability. Parent’s human capital when old is related to human
capital when young by a coefficient ξ > 1, capturing the life-cycle of earnings. The policy
rules for consumption and early schooling expenditures in this problem are written as gcy(xy)
and ge(xy).
2.3 Old Parents’ Problem
At the beginning of the period, an old parent faces the individual state vector xo ≡ (ho, pi, pˆi)
where ho is human capital, pi is child’s innate ability, and pˆi is child’s acquired ability. Innate
ability of the child is a state variable for the old’s parent since it may affect grandchild’s
innate ability depending on the intergenerational correlation of innate abilities. Given prices
and the stochastic processes for innate abilities and college completion, the problem of an
old parent is given by the following functional equation
Vo(ho, pi, pˆi) = max
s∈{0,1}
{V s0o (xo), EθV s1o (xo, θ)},
where V s0o (xo) is the option value of no college education for the child and V
s1
o (xo, θ) is the
option value of college education for the child conditional on the college completion shock θ.
We denote θ = 1 (or θ1) the college completion and θ = 0 (or θ0) the college dropout. The
expected option value of college education is given by,
EθV
s1
o (xo, θ) = q(pˆi)V
s1
o (xo, θ1) + (1− q(pˆi))V s1o (xo, θ0),
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where q(pˆi) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of college completion. We assume that q is an increasing
function, with q(0) = 0 and q(∞) = 1. Parents make the decision whether to send their
child to college or not before knowing the realization of the college completion shock.
The option value of not sending the child to college is given by,
V s0o (xo) = maxco>0
{
u(co) + βEpi′
[
Vy(h
′
y, pi
′)|pi
]}
,
s.t. co = (1− τ)(who + wh′y),
h′y = pˆi,
where co is household’s consumption, h
′
y is next period child’s human capital, and pi
′ is
grandchild’s innate ability.
The option value of college is given by,
V s1o (xo, θ) = maxco>0
{
u(co) + βEpi′
[
Vy(h
′
y, pi
′)|pi
]}
,
s.t. co + (1− κ (who)) f [θn¯+ (1− θ)n] =
(1− τ)
(
who + wh
′
y [θ(1− n¯) + (1− θ)(1− n)]
)
,
h′y = θp¯pˆi + (1− θ)pˆi,
where f > 0 is the fixed resource cost of college education per unit of time measured in terms
of the output good, n¯ and n are the time cost of college education, for college completion and
college dropout, and p¯ is the individual college completion premium. Notice that dropouts
receive no human capital premium. The function κ(who) represents a government subsidy
received by parents for each unit of output spent in college education. We assume that κ
is a decreasing function of parent’s earnings, with κ(0) ≤ 1 and κ(∞) = 0, to represent a
progressive subsidy scheme. The old parent’s problem generates policy rules gco(xo, s, θ) and
gs(xo).
2.4 Firm’s Problem
Under a constant returns to scale technology, the representative firm solves a static opti-
mization problem defined by
max
H>0
{Y − wH} ,
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s.t. Y = F (H).
We write fH as the optimal policy rule generated by this problem.
2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
Clearing in the human capital market requires
fH(µ) = H =
∫
hydµy(xy) +
∫
hodµo(xo)+
∫
{[1− gs(xo)]pˆi + gs(xo) [p¯pˆi(1− n¯)q(pˆi) + pˆi(1− n)(1− q(pˆi))]} dµo(xo).
The government balanced budget condition requires that total public expenditures in edu-
cation (early education+college) equals the income tax revenue
g + κF = τY,
with
κF = f
∫
κ (who) g
s(xo) [n¯q(pˆi) + n(1− q(pˆi))] dµo(so).
Finally, the resource constraint for the economy is given by,
Y = F (H) = Cy + Co + E + F + g,
where Cy, Co, and E are obtained by adding the corresponding policy rules across the entire
population, and
F = f
∫
gs(xo) [n¯q(pˆi) + n(1− q(pˆi))] dµo(xo).
2.6 Definition of Equilibrium
A Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium in this economy is a set of functions Vy(xy),
Vo(xo), g
cy(xy), g
e(xy), g
co(xo, s, θ), g
h′y(xo, s, θ), g
s(so), f
H , price w, government expendi-
tures in early education g, and time invariant distributions of young and old parents (µy, µo)
across states, such that: (i) Given w and g, young and adult parents solve their optimization
problems and policy functions are optimal, (ii) Given w, fH maximizes firms profits, and
(iii) Markets clear and the government budget is balanced.
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3 Restricting the Economy
In order to obtain numerical solutions for our model economy, we have to specify the relevant
functional forms and calibrate parameter values. We do this to represent as close as possible
relevant features the U.S. economy at the beginning of the nineties, in particular, the level
and composition of expenditures in education, the disparity in college attainment and earn-
ings, and the degree of intergenerational mobility. The benchmark economy is the basis in
which we implement in the next section counterfactual experiments regarding the sources of
persistence (innate abilities, early education, and college education) and the consequences
of changes in government policy.
3.1 Functional Forms
We use a constant relative risk aversion utility function to describe preferences
u (c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ ,
and a linear constant returns to scale production technology
F (H) = AH.
We also choose the acquired ability (or early education) function,
G(pi, e+ g) = pi(e+ g)γ,
with 0 < γ < 1. Notice that g and e are perfect substitutes in creating acquired ability.
We do not interpret this as a claim that private and public schools are perfect substitutes.
Instead, following Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1996, 1998), we observe that public schools in
different communities have different budgets because the common (federal and state) funding
is complemented with local funding raised through income taxes. Therefore, public schools
in richer communities receive more local funding. Our model should be interpreted as a
extreme case in which each parent is a community and therefore chooses the amount of local
(private) funding to public schools. In this sense, private funding e and common funding g
are perfect substitutes.
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With respect to the college completion probability function, we assume
q(pˆi) = min
{
ψ0 (1 + pˆi)
ψ1 , 1
}
,
with ψ0 > 0 and ψ1 > 0. This function is flexible enough to include as special cases
a concave, linear or convex function. The shape of this function is very important for
economic decisions in our model, since marginal changes in college completion probabilities
are important determinants of the relative incentives for early investments in education
between rich and poor parents. Our calibration procedure below allows for the shape of this
function and other parameters to be determined by a set of calibration targets in the U.S.
data.
Finally, we parameterize the government subsidy function to college education as
κ (who) = max {1− κowho, 0} ,
this is, a linear decreasing function of parent’s earnings. We choose a linear subsidy for its
simplicity and because it has been often used in the Public Economics literature.
3.2 Intergenerational Transmission of Abilities
Innate abilities follow a first order discrete Markov process. We restrict the vector of states
for pi and the elements in the transition matrix Φ in such a way that our process mimics the
continuous AR(1) process,
log(pi′) = ρ log(pi) + ² ² ∼ N(0, σ2pi).
Tauchen (1986) provides a method to construct the mapping from a continuous AR(1)
process to a first order Markov chain. Notice that, by construction, the resulting discrete
process for pi has mean equal to one, satisfies pimin > 0, and converges to a log-normal
stationary distribution,
pi → logN(0, σ2pi/(1− ρ)).
In this way, our Markov process for abilities depends only on two parameters: ρ and σpi.
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3.3 Calibration
Having restricted the model economy, we need to choose values for the following parameters:
β, σ (preferences), A (technology), γ, f , n¯, n, p¯, ψ0,ψ1 (education), ξ (life-cycle), τ , κo
(income tax and college subsidy) and σpi, ρ (stochastic process for innate abilities).
A few parameters have a direct empirical counterpart. With a length of a period in the
model of 16 years, we set n¯ = 0.25 and n = 0.125 corresponding to 4 years of college education
and an average of 2 years in college for drop-outs (see Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2001
and Manski and Wise, 1983). We set ξ = 1.10 as the average wage of a male full-time worker
49-64 years old relative to a 33-48 years old, in both cases with college education, obtained
for 1990 from the PSID. We normalize A = 1 and choose β = 0.52 (equivalent to an annual
discount factor of 0.96). There is very little guidance on the value for the inter-temporal
preference parameter, therefore we follow the real business cycle literature and use σ = 1.5.
We choose an earnings premium for college students of p¯ = 1.5. This number requires a
brief discussion. In our model, p¯ represents the lifetime earnings premium for an individual
that completes college, relative to the same individual in the counterfactual situation of
not attending college. This cannot be directly mapped into the rates of return for college
education obtained from standard Mincer regressions, since these rates do not typically
correct for the ability bias implied by the selection of individuals between college and non-
college choices. There is a large literature addressing this issue. We refer to the seminal
paper by Willis and Rosen (1979) that, adjusting for selection in ability, finds a lifetime rate
of return of attending college of 9.9% per year. Even though this number does not explicitly
consider the completion premium, we consider it a conservative estimate of the return to
college education, therefore p¯ = exp(0.099× 4) = 1.5.
It is also important to discuss the empirical counterpart of expenditures in education
in our model. Total expenditures in early education (e + g) in our model corresponds to
the sum of public and private expenditures in primary and elementary education in the
data. From the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1999) we find that expenditures in primary
and elementary education represent 4.4% of GDP for 1990 and we use it as a target of our
calibration procedure (see item 3 in the list below). From this number, we include as public
expenditures in primary and elementary education (g in our model) only federal and state
expenditures, adding up to 2.1% of GDP. Local government expenditures in early education
are imputed to e, since they vary across households according to the community where they
live.
Using again data from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1999), total college expen-
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ditures (F in our model) represent 2.8% of GDP in 1990. This is another target in our
calibration procedure (see item 4 in the list below). Public expenditures account for 64% of
total college expenditures, another target of our calibration (see item 5 in the list below).
Adding public federal and state expenditures in early education and total government expen-
ditures in college education, we obtain a share of public expenditures in education of 3.9%
of GDP. In our model, this target determines directly the proportional tax rate on earnings
τ = (g + κF )/y = 0.039.
The remaining seven parameters are simultaneously calibrated to match the following
observations for the U.S. economy (targets) with the corresponding endogenous variables in
the model:
1. Fraction of non-college over total 33-48 years old workers of 0.54 (from PSID, 1990).
2. Fraction of college students that drop-out of 0.5 (from PSID, 1990).
3. Share of total expenditures in early education over GDP equal to 4.4% (see discussion
above).
4. Share of total expenditures in college education over GDP equal to 2.8% (idem).
5. Fraction of public college expenditures over total college expenditures of 64% (idem).
6. Standard deviation of the log of permanent earnings across all workers equal to 0.66
(from Mulligan, 1997)7.
7. Degree of intergenerational persistence of earnings of 0.4 (from Solon, 1992 and others,
as reviewed in the introduction).
The calibration procedure involves solving a non-linear system of seven equations (one
for each target) with seven unknowns (the value of the parameters ψ0, ψ1, γ, f , κ0, σpi, and
ρ). Because solving the stationary equilibrium involves finding g that is consistent with a
6The standard deviation of log earnings in the PSID is around 0.8. However, this is not the measure of dis-
parity in earnings consistent with our model, since it includes temporary idiosyncratic earnings shocks, from
which we abstract. The measure of permanent earnings in Mulligan (1997) uses 5-year averages to mitigate
temporary shocks, reducing the disparity. Notice however that other authors, using different methodologies,
have obtained even smaller disparities in permanent earnings. For example, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994)
obtain a standard deviation of the log of permanent earnings of 0.49 and Zimmerman (1992) decomposes log
earnings into permanent and temporary components obtaining a standard deviation of 0.4. He finds that
the permanent component of earnings accounts for 2/3 of the cross-sectional variance.
7We thank Casey Mulligan for supplying the tabulations of Tables A1 and A2 (pages 252-253 in Mulligan,
1997) for the combined sample of Groups 1 and 2 and for the data in logs.
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balanced budget, our computational strategy looks for a fixed point of the equilibrium and
calibration parameters at the same time8.
4 Results for the Benchmark Economy
We compute statistics for the benchmark economy as described in the previous section and
compare them to the calibration targets. In this economy, investments in education account
for half of the intergenerational persistence in earnings and one fourth of the cross-sectional
inequality in permanent earnings.
4.1 Calibration Targets
The benchmark economy reproduces the calibration targets very well. Table 1 reports the
results of the model along the dimensions specified in the previous section. In the benchmark
economy, as in the data, the fraction of children enrolled in college is 46%, but only half
of these actually graduate from college. These results are obtained using a completion
probability function that is almost linear in acquired abilities (ψ1 ≈ 1). The proportion of
resources devoted to early education and college education are 4.4% and 3% of aggregate
output in the model, while these are 4.4% and 2.8% of GDP in the data.
The implied elasticity of acquired ability with respect to expenditures in early educa-
tion, γ = 0.24, is in the range of values estimated in the empirical literature regarding human
capital production functions9. The public share of college expenditures of 64% is matched
exactly using a highly progressive subsidy, with slope κ0 = 0.38.
Finally, the AR(1) process for abilities is calibrated to exactly match the standard
deviation of the log (0.6) and the coefficient of intergenerational persistence (0.4) of perma-
nent earnings in the data. We measure disparity in the model as the standard deviation of
log (who) across parents, and the degree of intergenerational persistence as the estimated βˆ1
coefficient in the regression
log
(
wh′y
)
= β0 + β1 log (who) + ε,
8A brief description of the computational strategy is described in the appendix. A more detailed descrip-
tion of the computational algorithm is available from the authors upon request.
9Haley (1976) and Heckman (1975) estimates of this elasticity are between 0.4 and 0.6 using a broader
definition of inputs in human capital production, while Card and Krueger (1996) find an elasticity of 0.1 to
0.2 using a narrower definition of inputs.
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using a simulated sample of parent-children pairs. Since the implied disparity and inter-
generational persistence in innate abilities are around 0.4 and 0.2, respectively, the model
amplifies the effect of innate abilities in these two dimensions, that is, the model generates
endogenously both disparity and persistence.
Table 1: Calibration of Benchmark Model
Target Data Model Parameter Value
1. Fraction of non-college 0.54 0.54 ψ0 0.27
2. Dropout rate 0.50 0.50 ψ1 1.01
3. Early education/GDP 0.044 0.044 γ 0.24
4. College/GDP 0.028 0.030 f 0.75
5. Public/total college 0.64 0.64 κ0 0.38
6. Std(log earnings) 0.60 0.60 σpi 0.44
7. Interg. persist. earnings 0.40 0.40 ρ 0.21
4.2 Policy Rules and Amplification Mechanisms
The amplification mechanisms of the model can be easily observed in Figure 1. To construct
this figure, we simulate the benchmark economy for a large number (10,000) of parents
drawn from the invariant distribution µ. For each parent, we use the policy rules and
random realizations of the completion shock to predict the level of education and human
capital of the corresponding child. We then classify parents in earnings quintiles, and for
each quintile we compute averages of children’s innate ability, acquired ability, and human
capital. Finally, for comparison purposes, we plot the average of these variables in each
quintile relative to the first (bottom) quintile.
In Figure 1, innate abilities increase with parents earnings since a fraction of these
abilities are inherited. However, the increase is small, only about 30% from the lowest to
the top quintile. In the case of acquired abilities, the relation with parents earnings is
much steeper, with an increase from the lowest to the top quintile of almost 90%. This is
entirely due to differences in investments in early education between rich and poor families,
as shown in the corresponding policy function (see Figure 2). Since parents face severe
borrowing constraints, only rich young parents can invest the efficient level of education,
while poorer parents invest progressively less in their children’s early education10. This
mechanism is standard in theories of intergenerational mobility, for instance Becker (1993).
10This policy rule also displays a compensating effect of expenditures with respect to innate abilities.
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Coming back to Figure 1, there is a further increase in children’s human capital of rich
parents due to college education. As a result, children’s human capital is 110% higher for
the top earnings quintile compared to the lowest quintile, about 3.5 times the comparable
difference in innate abilities. The policy rule for college enrollment (see Figure 3) shows that
high acquired ability children, mostly coming from rich households, go to college and further
increase their human capital. Low acquired ability children, coming out mostly from poor
households, for the same reason, do not go to college. The exception are low ability children
of very rich parents, but this is unlikely to be important quantitatively since the mass of
individuals in this situation (given by the invariant distribution) is very small. Average
acquired ability children go to college if their parents are rich enough to pay for college
education, or poor enough to receive almost full government subsidy11.
The resulting average college enrollment and completion rates by parent’s earnings
quintile are plotted in the top panel of Figure 4. We observe that rich parents are not only
more likely to send their children to college, but also these children exhibit higher gradua-
tion rates. This property of college enrolment and completion rates across earnings groups
is exactly what we observe in the data. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows these statistics
from the data, computed by Manski (1992) using data from the U.S. Current Population
Survey. Notice, however, that this property of the college enrolment and completion rates
across earnings groups is not a direct result of our calibration procedure, but an endoge-
nous consequence of the incentives implied by the college completion probabilities and the
progressive college subsidy scheme.
An alternative way of illustrating the source of inequality and persistence in the model
is to look at these variables at each stage of life in our model: when born, before college, and
after college. Table 2 reports inequality and persistence at these stages of life in the model.
Two striking results emerge. First, endogenous earnings persistence happens at the early
education stage, in fact, college reduces persistence in the benchmark economy. Second,
most of the inequality in earnings generated by endogenous investments in education is due
to college outcomes. Therefore, early education is central to understanding persistence in
Parents invest more in low ability children because the return of raising their acquired ability is higher. Still,
rich parents are more able to compensate low ability children than poor parents.
11Both extremes are likely to highlight two sources of inefficiencies in the benchmark economy. First,
old parents might also be borrowed constrained, so their decision of sending or not their children to college
depends on their earnings. Second, a highly progressive college subsidy might induce poor parents to send
their children to college independently on their acquired ability and hence on their chances of graduating.
The importance of these distortions for the amplification effect of college education is investigated in the
experiments in the next section.
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earnings while college education accounts for a large portion of inequality. This role of early
and college education in persistence and inequality of earnings are central to understanding
public policy implications discussed below.
Table 2: Inequality and Persistence in the Benchmark Economy
Innate Ability Acquired Ability Human Capital
Std(log x) 0.45 0.49 0.60
Int. Correlation 0.21 0.42 0.40
4.3 Intergenerational Persistence
While the model reproduces the degree of intergenerational persistence of earnings of 0.4,
we would like to decompose this persistence into exogenous and endogenous components.
The exogenous ability persistence needed to account of the observed correlation of earnings
across generations is ρ = 0.21, that is, roughly half of the intergenerational persistence in
earnings is accounted for by endogenous educational investments. This doesn’t mean that a
model with no innate persistence in abilities between parents and children would generate a
persistence of earnings of 0.19, since the interaction between innate abilities and educational
investments could potentially increase or decrease this number. In the next section, we
report an experiment with zero innate ability persistence (ρ = 0) and provide a definite
decomposition.
We calculate the degree of intergenerational persistence in other economic variables
using simulations of the benchmark economy. These are reported in the first column of Table
4. First, the intergenerational correlation of household consumption between parents and
children when adults is 0.66 in the model. Mulligan reports a coefficient of intergenerational
persistence of consumption of 0.68. Second, we compute the intergenerational persistence
of educational attainment. In the benchmark economy this number is 0.2. Mulligan (1999)
reports an intergenerational correlation of schooling for the U.S. economy around 0.29. In the
experiments below, we show that the correlation of educational attainment between parents
and their children in the model is due to a combination of intergenerational innate ability
persistence and early schooling investments. Keane and Wolpin (2001) obtain similar results
in their structural estimation of the U.S economy.
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4.4 Cross-Sectional Disparity
Table 4 reports additional statistics regarding cross-sectional disparity. As another illustra-
tion of the amplification effect of the model, we verify that the initial disparity in abilities
(0.45), measured as the standard deviation of the log, increase as a result of differences in
educational investments to 0.49 in acquired abilities (due to early education), and to 0.6 in
human capital or earnings (due to college education).
The average wage of college graduates, relative to non college workers, is 2.56 in the
benchmark economy. This number is much higher than the college premium p¯ = 1.5, due to
positive selection in abilities resulting from the endogeneity of college enrollment decisions:
on average, college graduates have more acquired ability than non-college workers, so they
would have earned more even if not attending college. The average wage of college dropouts
relative to non-college workers is 1.76, entirely due to the selection effect.
We compute similar statistics using a sample of 33-48 year-old workers from the 1990
PSID, and obtain an average relative wage of 2.33 for those which completed college and 1.41
for college dropouts, with respect to workers without any college education. These numbers
are lower than in our model, but there are at least two reasons why this should be the
case. First, workers with college education have steeper age-earnings profiles, so the lifetime
premium should be higher than our estimate from the data. Second, our model abstracts
from a comparative advantage mechanism, in which low ability individuals perform better
in low skill jobs that require no college education. Including this mechanism would reduce
the wage premia in the benchmark economy.
Our model has two important limitations. First, we do not have financial assets that
allow for inter-temporal or intergenerational consumption smoothing. Second, the model
does not include any post-college idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Both are important issues
from which we abstract. As a result, we obtain implausibly large correlations between
earnings and education, and between earnings and consumption (see again the first column
in Table 4). Adding these features would certainly make the implications of the model closer
to the data in these dimensions.
5 Sources of Persistence
What are the sources of intergenerational persistence in our model? In this section, we
illustrate the role of key features of the environment by calibrating alternative specifications
of the benchmark economy. We consider three alternative calibrations: no innate ability
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values in Different Economies
No Innate No Early No College
Parameter Benchmark Persistence Education Education
ψ0 0.27 0.27 0.38 −
ψ1 1.01 1.01 0.36 −
γ 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.27
f 0.75 0.69 1.52 −
κ0 0.38 0.39 0.33 −
σpi 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.55
ρ 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.21
persistence, no early education, and no college education. Our most important finding in
this section is that early education is a fundamental component of earnings persistence.
5.1 No Innate Ability Persistence (ρ = 0)
In this version of the economy, we assume no intergenerational persistence of innate ability
(ρ = 0). We calibrate the economy to the same targets as in the benchmark economy,
except the intergenerational correlation of earnings. The parameter values resulting from
this calibration are reported in Table 3 along with parameter values for the benchmark
economy and other experiments. No ability persistence is a central feature of the theory in
Loury (1981) and the quantitative theory in Caucutt and Kumar (2001).
Persistence Table 4 reports the results of the experiment. The main reuslt is the decrease
in the intergenerational persistence of earnings compared to the benchmark economy, from
0.4 to 0.24. Notice that the intergenerational persistence generated by endogenous human
capital investments in the model is slightly larger than the one generated by the same
component of investments in the presence of innate ability correlation between parents and
children. The reason is that with no correlation of innate abilities between parents and
children, borrowing constraints to educational investments become more severe, that is, it is
more likely that low earnings parents have high ability children and therefore are limited in
the amount of resources that can be allocated to education.
The intergenerational correlation of educational attainment falls to virtually zero, while
it is 0.20 in the benchmark economy. This is in contrast to the results in Caucutt and
Kumar (2001). In their model, the correlation of educational attainment is generated by
the exogenous dropout probabilities, by assuming that children of college educated parents
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Table 4: Sources of Intergenerational Persistence of Earnings
No Innate No Early No College
Benchmark Persistence Education Education
(ρ = 0) (γ = 0) (f →∞)
Intergenerational persistence
- Earnings 0.40 0.24 0.16 0.41
- Educational attainment 0.20 −.02 −.05 1.00
- Consumption 0.66 0.55 0.55 0.69
Cross-sectional disparity
- Std(log innate abilities) 0.45 0.48 0.55 0.57
- Std(log acquired abilities) 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.60
- Std(log earnings) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Cross-sectional correlation
- Log earnings/education 0.85 0.81 0.47 −
- Log earnings/consumption 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.85
Average wage premium
- College/non-college 2.56 2.45 1.49 −
- Dropouts/non-college 1.76 1.64 1.02 −
are less likely to dropout. With endogenous dropout probabilities, innate ability correlation
is important for educational attainment persistence given the risk of college completion.
However, innate ability correlation is not enough. In the next experiment, we show that the
lack of educational attainment persistence occurs when innate abilities are correlated but
there is no early education, hence, both early education and innate ability persistence are
important for generating the observed positive intergenerational persistence in educational
attainment in our model.
Discussion Figure 5 shows the sources of persistence in this model. While innate ability
is not systematically related with parent’s earnings groups, acquired ability and human
capital are strongly related with parent’s earnings. Notice that most of the differences show
up right away at the early education level, and the college education adds little to this
disparity, perhaps most in the highest earnings group. Another implication of the model
without innate ability persistence is the behavior of college enrollment and completion by
earnings groups. Figure 6 shows that enrollment follows an inverted U-shape with parent’s
earnings. That is, no ability persistence implies that more individuals from poor families are
talented and these individuals tend to enroll in college. Notice however, that this implication
is inconsistent with the data.
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5.2 No Early Education (γ = 0)
We modify the benchmark economy by eliminating early education. The purpose of this
experiment is to evaluate the role of early and college education in generating outcomes
in the benchmark economy. We implement the no early education economy by setting the
return to resources in early education to zero (γ = 0). Given this assumption, both private
and public expenditures in early education are equal to zero, implying that acquired and
innate ability of each individual are equal at the college stage.
We calibrate the economy to match the following targets: fraction of non-college, frac-
tion of dropouts, college expenditures over GDP (private and public), and the standard
deviation of log earnings. We reduce the extent of the government in the economy by con-
sidering only the resources allocated to higher education. The variance of innate ability
necessary to reproduce the variance in earnings is higher in the absence of early education.
Another important implication of the calibration is that the parameters related to college
completion (ψ0 and ψ1) imply a much flatter relationship with acquired ability than the
one implied by the benchmark calibration. A summary of the parameter values needed to
match the calibration targets are reported in Table 3. The results of the experiment are
summarized in Table 4.
Persistence The model without early education generates a relatively low persistence
of earnings across generations, 0.16. Notice that the persistence is even lower than the
exogenous persistence introduced in the model through innate ability, 0.20. Therefore, college
education serves as an equalizing force in the economy. This is due to the the progressivity of
the college subsidy, since poor families face a lower cost of attending college; and the risk of
college completion. As a result, college enrollment rate is decreasing in parents’ earnings (see
Figure 6), and there is almost no correlation in educational attainment across generations.
Discussion The correlation between earnings and education is much lower in this version
of the model than in the benchmark economy, 0.47 and 0.85 respectively. Also the absence
of early education substantially reduces the wage premium with respect to the benchmark
economy. With a college completion probability that depends on acquired ability (innate
ability in this case), college education alone does not generate an intergenerational corre-
lation of educational attainment even in the presence of innate ability correlation. Again,
the role of early education and innate ability persistence on acquired ability and its im-
pact on college completion are important in generating the intergenerational correlation of
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educational attainment.
5.3 No College Education (f →∞)
We implement the economy with no college education by setting the fixed cost f to a level
where no individual finds it optimal to obtain college education. In the calibration we
set the value of government resources devoted to education to correspond only to primary
and elementary education. The economy is calibrated to match the following targets: the
fraction of non-college, fraction of dropouts, early education expenditures over GDP, and
the standard deviation of log earnings. The parameters needed to match these targets are
reported in Table 3 and the results from this economy in Table 4.
Persistence Compared to the benchmark economy, the model with no college education
generates a similar, if not higher, correlation of earnings across generations. This result
supports the view that progressive, need-based, college subsidies have a positive, although
limited, impact on earnings mobility.
Discussion The results of the model without college education are similar to those for
the benchmark economy, with the only exception being that most earnings inequality is
generated exogenously by the inequality in innate ability. Therefore, college education is an
important component of earnings inequality in the model. Another way of illustrating this
result is that in the benchmark economy, 1/4 of the earnings inequality is due to endogenous
investments in education (where 70% of this due to college education) while in the non-college
economy only 1/20 is generated by endogenous investments in education.
6 Policy Experiments
Our theory of intergenerational earnings inequality with early and college education is suited
to study the implications of government policies towards education. First, we analyze the
effect of a 20% increase in total government expenditures in education if (i) the increase
is devoted to early education, or (ii) if the additional resources are allocated to college
subsidies. We show that the first policy is more effective than the second in reducing the
intergenerational persistence of earnings. Finally, we consider a modification of the pro-
gressive (need-based) college subsidy to a flat subsidy, and find that such a change would
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Table 5: Policy Experiments
Increase Increase Flat
Benchmark Early College College
Expendit. Subsidy Subsidy
Intergenerational persistence
- Earnings 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.48
- Educational attainment 0.20 0.10 0.17 0.53
- Consumption 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.68
Cross-sectional disparity
- Std(log innate abilities) 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
- Std(log acquired abilities) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48
- Std(log earnings) 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58
Cross-sectional correlation
- Log earnings/education 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.77
- Log earnings/consumption 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90
Average wage premium
- College/non-college 2.56 2.51 2.62 2.29
- Drop outs/non-college 1.76 1.73 1.78 1.54
Expenditures (percent of GDP)
- Private early education 2.31 1.77 2.30 2.26
- Public early education 1.98 2.80 1.98 1.99
- Private college education 1.10 1.05 1.27 0.82
- Public college education 1.92 1.92 2.66 1.91
Other Aggregate Statistics
- College enrolment 0.46 0.47 0.63 0.41
- Dropout rate 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.50
- Aggregate human capital (GDP) 2.15 2.22 2.20 2.11
- Aggregate consumption 1.99 2.05 2.02 1.96
considerably increase persistence. Notice that the three policies implicitly assume that the
government cannot observe the ability of children, only parents’ earnings.
6.1 Increase in Early Education Expenditures
In the first experiment, we increase the share of total public resources devoted to education
over GDP by 20%, to τ = 0.047, keeping constant the share of expenditures in college
education over GDP (κF/y = 0.0192). As a result, in equilibrium, public resources devoted
to early education increase from 1.98% to 2.8% of GDP. The results of this experiment
compared with the benchmark economy are reported in Table 5.
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Persistence The intergenerational persistence of earnings falls by a sizable amount, from
0.4 in the benchmark economy to 0.34. The persistence in educational attainment and con-
sumption are also reduced. As expected, this policy mitigates budget constraint problems
for poor families that need it the most, that is, when investing in the early education of
their children. Moreover, since the subsidy is lump-sum and public and private expenditures
in education are perfect substitutes in production, there is a large substitution effect. The
increase in public early education expenditures is associated with a large decrease in pri-
vate expenditures, equalizing the quality of early education across children. A need-based
early education subsidy would be even more effective at mitigating credit constraints at this
investment stage.
College Enrollment and Completion The policy produces a small increase in aggregate
college enrollment and a small decrease in the dropout rate, due again to the substitution
effect. Since parents substitute private with public expenditures in early education, the effect
of this policy on the dropout probabilities is considerably attenuated. By earnings groups,
the policy makes college enrollment less steep, since the quality of early education of poor
children increases and their dropout rate falls. Figures 6 and 7 compare college enrollment
and dropout rates by income groups under this policy and the benchmark economy.
Output, Consumption, and Efficiency As expected, this policy increases aggregate
human capital and therefore aggregate output. Perhaps surprisingly, it also increases aggre-
gate consumption, this is, output net education costs. Comparing the steady states of the
benchmark economy and the economy with higher government expenditures in early educa-
tion, the average parent consumes more in the latter economy. This is not a definite welfare
calculation of the benefits of such policy, since we do not compute the transition between
steady states. Nevertheless, the steady state comparison is interesting since it provides a
quantitative assessment of two contradictory effects. First, the increase in government ex-
penditures mitigates the distortion introduced by borrowing constraints to investments in
early education by poor parents, increasing efficiency. Second, this lump-sum subsidy also
benefits rich parents with low ability children, that receive a higher than optimal level of
education. The numerical experiment shows that, relative to the benchmark calibration, the
first effect dominates and efficiency is enhanced through this policy.
Discussion These policy implications of the model are consistent with the available cross-
country evidence. Both Canada and Sweden have lower measures of inequality and intergen-
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erational persistence than the U.S. (see Corak and Heisz, 1999 for Canada and Bjo¨rklund
and Ja¨ntti, 1997 for Sweden). Differently than in the U.S., where a large proportion of early
educational investments are related to parent’s earnings, Canada and Sweden have early
educational systems that are mostly funded at the federal level, reducing the disparity in
school expenditures.
6.2 Increase in College Subsidies
In this experiment, we increase the aggregate share of public resources devoted to education
over GDP by 20%, that is a change in the tax rate, τ , from 0.039 in the benchmark economy to
0.047. We increase aggregate expenditures while keeping constant the share of expenditures
in early education over GDP (g/y = 0.0198) and the the progressiveness of the college
subsidy, κo = 0.38. Under these assumptions, the increase in expenditures amounts to
choosing a college subsidy, κ1, in order to reproduce a share of public resources devoted to
college education over GDP of 2.66%, where the college subsidy function is given by,
κ (who) = min {max {κ1 − κowho, 0} , 1} .
The resulting parameter value is κ1 = 1.025.
Persistence The third column of Table 5 reports the result of the experiment. The in-
tergenerational persistence of earnings and consumption is the same as in the benchmark
economy, while the persistence in educational attainment falls by a small amount. This
policy fails in reducing persistence because it benefits poor parents too late, when the early
education decisions have already been made.
College Enrollment and Completion The increase in college subsidy generates an in-
crease in aggregate college enrollment. Figure 6 shows that this increase is larger for poor
families, due to the progressivity of the subsidy. However, the aggregate drop-out rate also
increases. Poor families are still constrained at the early education level, so the average
acquired ability of their children is still low. The increase in the subsidy makes them to
attend college, but does not change their high dropout probability (see Figure 7).
Output, Consumption, and Efficiency The policy also produces an increase in aggre-
gate human capital (output) and aggregate consumption, but smaller in size to the previous
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policy. The experiment confirms that borrowing constraints (and the distortions induced by
them) are more important at the early educational stage.
6.3 Flat College Subsidy
In the last experiment, we move from progressive subsidy considered in the calibration of our
benchmark economy to a flat college subsidy, independent of the individual’s family earnings.
We assume a college subsidy function κ = κ0 and choose κ0 to match the resources allocated
by the government to college. In this sense, this is an expenditure-neutral experiment. We
keep all other parameter values of the benchmark economy the same.
Persistence A flat college subsidy produces a significant increase in the intergenerational
persistence of earnings and educational attainment, as shown in the last column of Table
5. The reason is that it increases the incentives to invest in early education for children of
richer families who later on go to college at a higher subsidized rate than in a progressive
subsidy. A higher proportion of the college subsidy go to children of higher earnings families,
worsening the borrowing constraint of poor families at the college level. Hence, poor families
reduce their investment in early education.
College Enrolment and Completion A flat college subsidy produces the same drop-
out rate as in the benchmark economy, but it reduces slightly college attendance. This is
the result of two opposing effects across family earnings: the proportion of children of poor
families attending college falls while the proportion of children from rich families increases.
The steepness of the college enrollment profile across earnings groups, documented in Figure
6, is much higher than in the benchmark economy. Regarding college completion rates by
earnings groups, Figure 7 reports the differences between a flat and a progressive subsidy:
under the flat subsidy completion rates are decreasing in earnings groups, while there are
increasing under the progressive subsidy. This is, with a flat subsidy poor children going to
college are more positively selected, but the opposite occurs with rich children. These two
effects cancel out at the aggregate dropout rate.
Output, Consumption, and Efficiency Under a flat subsidy, aggregate human capital
(output) and consumption falls relative to the benchmark economy. Again, this is due
to the fact that the flat subsidy aggravates the budget constraint for poor families with
able children. Notice that the optimal policy would eliminate all credit constraints, and
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allocations would be entirely due to innate ability considerations. A progressive subsidy
achieves this objective more than a flat subsidy since it allocates resources where they are
needed the most, that is, among families with able children who face credit restrictions to
finance educational expenditures.
7 Conclusions
We develop a model of early human capital investments and college education that is suited to
study the interaction of ability, investment opportunities, and luck in determining disparity
and persistence in education and earnings. We find that differences in the quality of early
education is the most important component of earnings persistence across generations.
In this framework we study government policies often motivated to promote equal
opportunities. We find that policies that reduce the extent of credit constraints at the
early level to be the most productive in terms of reducing persistence while at the same
time, increasing aggregate output and consumption. Policies targeted at the college level
would have a limited impact on persistence. However, a need-based college subsidy system
is important to provide the right incentives for poor families to invest in early education.
There are three main limitations of our model. First, we abstract from any other asset
accumulation different from human capital. Second, we abstract from features different
from human capital that may determine earnings, in particular, we abstract from permanent
idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Third, we abstract from many other dimensions of early
human capital formation that may be important, like parent’s time in early development,
peer group effects and neighborhood effects, among others. These extensions are likely
to enhance our understanding of the channels addressed in this paper, the quantitative
implications of the theory, and the policy recommendations derived from it. Our simplified
theory of intergenerational earnings persistence motivates an important role of human capital
and policy in generating inequality and persistence in earnings, and these extensions are
natural steps for further research.
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A Computing a Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
The production function used in our model implies that the wage rate is equal to the tech-
nology parameter A. We normalize this price to one. Therefore, the computational task
amounts to finding the value functions for young and old parents and the associated policy
functions, for a given value of g, use these and the exogenous process for the stochastic
components of the model to compute the associated invariant distribution of agents across
states, and calculate the implied level of expenditures g that balance the government budget.
Therefore, the algorithm includes an outer loop that involves finding the equilibrium value
of g, plus the values of the seven parameters calibrated simultaneously. Given government
expenditures, an inner loop finds value functions and the invariant distribution by guessing
initial values and applying successive approximations until reaching the fixed point. The
steps are as follows:
1. Make initial guesses for value function of old adults, V i=0,j=0o and g
i
2. Given w, g, and V i,jo , obtain V
i,j+1
y from young parent’s problem and compute the
corresponding policy functions;
3. Given w, and V i,j+1y , obtain V
i,j+1
o from old parent’s problem and compute the corre-
sponding policy functions;
4. Check for convergence of value function by comparing V i,jo and V
i,j+1
o . If convergence
criteria is satisfied then go to the next step, otherwise iterate from step (2) until
convergence;
5. Guess a µy and use the optimal policy functions and law of motion for the shocks to
obtain the invariant distribution (µo) and then µ
′
y both implied by the operator T ;
continue until convergence of µy and
6. Using the invariant distribution and optimal policy functions, compute gi+1 by impos-
ing the budget constraint of the government, and compare with gi. Iterate from step
(2) until convergence is achieved.
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Figure 1: Ability and Human Capital by Parent’s Earnings Quintile
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Figure 2: Education Early Investment Policy
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Young Parent Earnings
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s 
(e)
Low Innate Ability
Average Innate Ability
High Innate Ability
32
Figure 3: College Enrollment Policy
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Figure 4: Enrollment and Completion Rates
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Figure 5: Ability and Human Capital: No Innate Ability Persistence
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Figure 6: Enrollment Rates in Different Economies
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Figure 7: Completion Rates in Different Economies
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